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Table 7 Correlation between Intermarriage and Decision Power

From: Relative labor supply in intermarriage

Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Distribution of income Immigrant Native
(=1 if \me“, =2 if \partner”, =3 if \shared”) Men Women Men Women
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly me”)
Intermarriage -0.085** -0.034 0.029** 0.002
Education -0.008** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.013***
Age -0.001 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly partner”)
Intermarriage -0.009 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
Education -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.008***
Age 0.001 -0.000 0.001** -0.000
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “shared”)
Intermarriage 0.094** 0.036 -0.028 -0.006
Education 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.020*** 0.022***
Age 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
Dep. Var.: Multinomial Logit
Final say on financial decision Immigrant Native
(=1 if “me”, =2 if “partner”, =3 if “both”) Men Women Men Women
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)
Intermarriage -0.100** 0.002 0.025 0.021
Education -0.002 -0.007** -0.007*** -0.007***
Age -0.003** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.001***
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)
Intermarriage 0.058** -0.024 -0.003 0.019
Education -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.011***
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “both”)
Intermarriage 0.041 0.022 -0.022 -0.040*
Education 0.014** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.018***
Age 0.004** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.002***
  1. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  2. People aged 20 to 65; year 2005 (financial decision), years 2004 and 2005 (agreement on income).
  3. Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that the variable takes on the particular outcome.
  4. Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.