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Table 7 Correlation between Intermarriage and Decision Power

From: Relative labor supply in intermarriage

Dep. Var.:

Multinomial Logit

Distribution of income

Immigrant

Native

(=1 if \me“, =2 if \partner”, =3 if \shared”)

Men

Women

Men

Women

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly me”)

Intermarriage

-0.085**

-0.034

0.029**

0.002

Education

-0.008**

-0.015***

-0.005***

-0.013***

Age

-0.001

0.001

-0.001***

0.000

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “mainly partner”)

Intermarriage

-0.009

-0.002

-0.001

0.003

Education

-0.017***

-0.015***

-0.015***

-0.008***

Age

0.001

-0.000

0.001**

-0.000

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “shared”)

Intermarriage

0.094**

0.036

-0.028

-0.006

Education

0.026***

0.030***

0.020***

0.022***

Age

0.000

-0.000

0.000

-0.000

Dep. Var.:

Multinomial Logit

Final say on financial decision

Immigrant

Native

(=1 if “me”, =2 if “partner”, =3 if “both”)

Men

Women

Men

Women

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)

Intermarriage

-0.100**

0.002

0.025

0.021

Education

-0.002

-0.007**

-0.007***

-0.007***

Age

-0.003**

-0.002**

-0.002***

-0.001***

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “partner”)

Intermarriage

0.058**

-0.024

-0.003

0.019

Education

-0.012***

-0.013***

-0.011***

-0.011***

Age

-0.001

-0.001

0.000

-0.001

Marginal effect on prob (outcome = “both”)

Intermarriage

0.041

0.022

-0.022

-0.040*

Education

0.014**

0.019***

0.018***

0.018***

Age

0.004**

0.003**

0.002***

0.002***

  1. Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
  2. People aged 20 to 65; year 2005 (financial decision), years 2004 and 2005 (agreement on income).
  3. Entries refer to marginal effects on the probability that the variable takes on the particular outcome.
  4. Clustered standard errors; * p ≤ 0:05, ** p ≤ 0:01, *** p ≤ 0:001.