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Table 4 Results on the willingness to migrate illegally: the role of expectations, relatives and migration policies

From: “Barcelona or die”: understanding illegal migration from Senegal

  Marginal effects
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log expected wage 0.075**    0.078**
  (2.31)    (2.25)
Having relatives abroad   0.144*   0.155*
   (1.86)   (1.94)
Restrictive immigration policies    0.206*** 0.200***
    (3.33) (3.21)
Log migration prices -0.340*** -0.314*** -0.333*** -0.345***
  (8.62) (8.73) (8.96) (8.76)
Log expenditure per capita -0.013 0.023 0.033 -0.036
  (0.26) (0.53) (0.69) (0.70)
Education level     
Secondary level -0.069 -0.071 -0.062 -0.066
  (0.91) (0.95) (0.82) (0.86)
University level -0.338*** -0.312*** -0.345*** -0.352***
  (5.09) (4.42) (4.76) (5.66)
Koranic school -0.024 -0.053 -0.034 -0.018
  (0.26) (0.62) (0.39) (0.20)
Male 0.059 0.066 0.100 0.015
  (0.58) (0.64) (1.06) (0.14)
Age 0.034 0.018 0.014 0.038
  (1.03) (0.57) (0.46) (1.17)
Age 2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
  (1.47) (1.11) (1.01) (1.60)
Married -0.171** -0.184** -0.156** -0.143*
  (2.28) (2.53) (2.02) (1.88)
Child is male -0.129 -0.109 -0.139 -0.127
  (1.39) (1.22) (1.48) (1.37)
Child is female -0.083 -0.047 -0.054 -0.048
  (0.81) (0.48) (0.53) (0.47)
Adult is male 0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.029
  (0.03) (0.10) (0.06) (0.39)
Ault is female 0.078 0.074 0.079 0.046
  (0.95) (0.90) (0.97) (0.53)
Home owner -0.053 -0.056 -0.030 -0.061
  (0.78) (0.82) (0.44) (0.88)
Mouride 0.157** 0.124* 0.138* 0.139*
  (2.21) (1.76) (1.96) (1.91)
Observations 339 343 343 339
  1. The dependent variable equals one if the individual is willing to migrate illegally and zero if he is willing to migrate only legally. The reference category of the variable education level is low education level. Robust z-statistics in parenthesis: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. All estimations include ethnic and region dummies.