Education, job insecurity and the within country migration of couples

Table 8 Migration probability (probit) selected marginal effects; dual earner

	Base model
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)
Power couple	0.108	0.112	0.105	0.079
Power couple	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.093)
Male-power couple	0.136	0.139	0.133	0.115
Male-power couple	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
Female-power couple	0.239**	0.239**	0.239**	0.234**
Female-power couple	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)
Origin—major city	−0.197**	−0.171*	−0.228**	−0.201**
Origin—major city	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.066)
Origin—rural	−0.092	−0.088	−0.093	−0.084
Origin—rural	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Labour market insecurity of MSR of origin (male)		−0.002
Labour market insecurity of MSR of origin (male)		(0.036)
Labour market insecurity of MSR of origin (female)		−0.018
Labour market insecurity of MSR of origin (female)		(0.034)
Unemployment rate in MSR of origin (male)			−1.660
Unemployment rate in MSR of origin (male)			(3.683)
Unemployment rate in MSR of origin (female)			−4.847
Unemployment rate in MSR of origin (female)			(4.635)
Disposable income (×10,000)				0.011
Disposable income (×10,000)				(0.006)
Female income share				−0.122
Female income share				(0.144)
No. obs.	10,136	10,136	10,136	10,136

HILDA Survey – Waves 2 to 9 (Pooled) All estimates (in models A to D) include controls for the age (and age squared) of each couple member; each couple member’s education relative to the MSR average for their occupation; dependent children in the household, least one couple member being foreign born, and if the couple are home owners. For ease of analysis, marginal effects are reported. p > abs(Z) in parenthesis. Significance levels: **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier